Comment on Preliminary Report on Freedom of Expression and Campus Harassment Codes by Sandalow, Terrance
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
1991
Comment on Preliminary Report on Freedom of
Expression and Campus Harassment Codes
Terrance Sandalow
University of Michigan Law School, sandalow@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/913
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Education Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sandalow, Terrance. "Comment on Preliminary Report on Freedom of Expression and Campus Harassment Codes." Academe 77, no.
6 (1991): 38-41.
Terrance Sandalow.1 Campus harassment codes 
pose an unprecedented problem for the AAUP, not 
only because the issues of academic freedom they raise 
are novel, but also because the academic community 
is itself deeply divided over those issues. Historically, 
the major assaults upon academic freedom have come 
from outside the academy- from politicians, trustees, 
and donors who have sought to limit inquiry and re- 
strict the expression of unpopular views. Ideas about 
academic freedom have been shaped in the course of 
repelling these assaults and in constructing barricades 
that will safeguard the freedoms to teach and to learn 
that are at the center of the academic enterprise. Per- 
haps it is not surprising, in these circumstances, that 
the rhetoric of academic freedom should have tended 
toward the absolute. Time, however, has a way of un- 
settling absolutes, bringing problems not previously 
anticipated or, if anticipated, not fully appreciated. The 
inter-group tensions that have led many institutions 
to adopt harassment codes are just such a problem. 
The extraordinary controversy that the codes have 
generated within the academic community suggests, 
at the very least, a need to consider whether the tradi- 
tional rhetoric of academic freedom- rhetoric designed 
to address concerns quite remote from those that have 
led to adoption of the codes- suffices to guide judg- 
ment concerning the issues they raise. 
The position staked out by Ernst Benjamin reveals the 
inadequacy of yesterday's absolutes for addressing 
today's problems- though, to be more precise, the ab- 
solutes he invokes are not yesterday's, but those of the 
day before yesterday. At the center of his argument is 
the distinction between "speech" and "conduct." The 
latter, he maintains, is an appropriate subject of regula- 
tion, but the former must be absolutely protected, save 
when violence is imminently threatened. The report's 
failure to observe that distinction, he concludes, leads 
it to err in two directions: first, by failing to consider 
the need for institutional regulations prohibiting harass- 
ing conduct, and second, by approving even the nar- 
row restrictions on speech that the report sanctions. 
With respect to the first of these criticisms, Benjamin 
has simply misread the report. The initial paragraphs 
of the report explicitly recognize the need for institu- 
tional regulations prohibiting not only violence and 
vandalism, but other forms of "physical harassment," 
a phrase that clearly encompasses all of Benjamin's ex- 
amples of conduct that is objectionable without regard 
to the content of the words that accompany it. 
1PThe remarks that follow should not be construed as those 
of the other members of the subcommittee, who have not had 
an opportunity to comment on them. 
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Benjamin's central disagreement with the report is 
with its conclusion that institutions may, without 
violating academic freedom, prohibit "status" epithets 
and the like that are directed at one or a small number 
of individuals with the intention of degrading or hu- 
miliating them. Despite the assaultive character of such 
speech, Benjamin concludes that it falls on the pro- 
tected side of the speech/conduct dichotomy that plays 
so large a role in his thinking about academic freedom. 
Students of the First Amendment have long recog- 
nized, however, that the distinction between speech 
and conduct will not bear the weight that Benjamin 
puts upon it. Words may at times be prohibited pre- 
cisely because of their content. Conversely, conduct 
may at times be protected by any reasonable concep- 
tion of academic freedom because the objections to it 
concern only its communicative impact. To put the 
point somewhat differently, the distinction between 
what is protected and what is unprotected by academic 
freedom depends upon a more refined analysis than 
the dichotomy between speech and conduct can 
provide. 
Benjamin comes close to recognizing the point when 
he acknowledges that "fighting words" may be pro- 
hibited, at least in the face of imminent violence. Simi- 
larly, as the report observes, "[tjhreats of violence and 
other forms of intimidation, even if purely verbal, are 
well beyond the bounds of academic freedom." Yet 
in each of these instances, as well as others that should 
come readily to mind, words are prohibited solely be- 
cause of their content. Conversely, as the Supreme 
Court's recent flag-burning decisions should remind 
us, a serious question of academic freedom would be 
raised if a university were to attempt to punish a frater- 
nity for burning a cross on the latter's own property. 
Or suppose that a group of students repeatedly place 
under the doors of black students' dormitory rooms 
fliers that contain nothing more than a string of de- 
meaning racial epithets. Benjamin's analysis leads one 
to suppose that he might regard such behavior as sanc- 
tionable conduct because it violates "rights of privacy 
which protect against unreasonable intrusions into 
one's living space ..." If so, would the same result ob- 
tain if another group of students were repeatedly to 
place under the doors of the same black students fliers 
announcing the meetings of the local Young Democrats 
and stating that minority students are especially 
welcome? All that distinguishes the two situations is 
the content of the two communications. Must we con- 
clude, then, that the university must either permit or 
prohibit both actions on identical terms? 
As these illustrations indicate, the speech/conduct 
dichotomy is too crude a response to the complex is- 
sues raised by campus harassment codes, however use- 
ful it may have seemed when dealing with such earlier 
issues as whether Communists should be allowed to 
teach or speak on campus. The simple answer to Ben- 
jamin's question-" Are we really prepared to establish 
a category of forbidden speech?"- is "of course." The 
only serious question is "what categories of speech may 
be forbidden without trenching upon the values that 
academic freedom is designed to serve." On that ques- 
tion, the difference between Benjamin and the subcom- 
mittee is, though not trivial, much narrower than one 
might gather from his comments. 
We agree, in the words of the report, that "within 
a college or university. . .there can be no forbidden 
ideas." We thus agree that codes which seek to pro- 
tect the members of designated groups from a "hos- 
tile environment" by prohibiting the expression of cer- 
tain ideas are inconsistent with the principles of 
academic freedom. We also agree that the mere use 
of "status" epithets should not be prohibited. How- 
ever offensive they may be, their use is often closely 
linked to the expression of ideas. 
The only disagreement between Benjamin and the 
subcommittee is whether the use of "status" epithets 
and the like may be proscribed in very narrow, well- 
defined circumstances, when they are directed at 
specific individuals with the intent of degrading or hu- 
miliating them. The subcommittee's position is that 
such utterances are more nearly assaultive than com- 
municative, more akin to threats than to the commu- 
nication of ideas. Benjamin does not dispute that judg- 
ment, nor does he make any attempt to suggest how 
the values academic freedom serves would be ad- 
vanced by protecting such behavior. But if, as the re- 
port argues and Benjamin does not deny, such verbal 
assaults are "not merely outside the dialogue of rea- 
son that is the raison d'être of academic institutions, but 
inimical to it," what reason can there be for arguing 
that they are protected by academic freedom? The 
closest Benjamin comes to offering a reason is his con- 
tention that the subcommittee's failure to propose a 
ban on all abusive epithets demonstrates that its real 
concern is with the ideas expressed by "status" 
epithets, not with their assaultive quality.2 The sub- 
committee was not, however, charged with address- 
ing the relationship between academic freedom and 
civility norms in general, but only with considering the 
issues of academic freedom posed by the wave of re- 
cent harassment codes. In any event, the report clearly 
sets out the subcommittee's conclusion that pruden- 
tial considerations, not principles of academic freedom, 
"counsel against any general attempt to proscribe" ex- 
treme personal abuse. But the report recognizes that 
the balance of prudential consideration might well be 
thought to shift when personal abuse involves the use 
of "status" epithets. To ignore the difference between 
calling someone a "dirty, mother-fucking son-of-a- 
bitch" and calling him a "dirty, mother-fucking fag- 
got kike" is simply to ignore the social realities of the 
world in which we live. Epithets like the latter, as the 
report argues, "attack attributes of an individual that 
are often central to personal identity, [and] to the ex- 
tent that [these] attributes are [also] the basis of wide- 
spread invidious discrimination, the injury [they in- 
flict on] the individual is likely to be cumulative and, 
therefore, felt with special intensity." Surely, institu- 
tions need not be insensitive to such differences in 
deciding whether disciplinary action is appropriate. 
Benjamin- who in this respect is joined by Donald 
Wagner- does make one valid point. The report does 
not detail with adequate clarity the precise speech that 
institutions may appropriately proscribe when it is 
2The report does not, in fact, propose prohibiting the use 
of "status" epithets, even when they are directed at specific 
individuals with the requisite intent. It merely concludes that 
institutions that do penalize the use of "status" epithets in 
such circumstances do not violate the principles of academic 
freedom. The decision whether to adopt a code containing 
such prohibition depends upon a number of prudential con- 
siderations that differ in different institutional settings. 
ACADEME November-December 1991 39 
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Tue, 11 Mar 2014 10:42:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
enja in's tral disagree ent i  t e report is 
i  ts clusion t t i stitutions ay, t 
violating cademic eedom, prohibit status" epithets 
d t e li e t at re irected t   al  ber 
f i ividuals i  t e i te tion f degrading  -
iliating e . espite e ssaultive aracter f ch 
speech, enjamin cl des at t l s  pro-
tected  f e speech/conduct dichotomy at plays 
 large  ole  is thinking out cademic eedom. 
e ts f e irst e t  long recog-
i , , t  i ti ction speech 
 ct ill r  eight t Benja in 
puts upon . rds ay t i es  prohibited pre-
cisely se  ir t t. Conversely, ct 
ay t i es  protected by any easonable concep-
i   demic o  se  objections   
rn only  unicative i pact.  put 
point t differently, i ti ction 
t  protected  t  unprotected by demic 
o  depends upon  e fi e  analysis  
 dichoto y  speech t 
provide. 
enjamin s   recognizing  point 
ackno ledges t" fighting ay pro-
ited,    e i t e. i-
larly,  report ves, "[t]hreats ce  
 s i i ation,  purely al, e 
I beyond e ic  t 
  nces,  I   s t l  
 readily  ,  e prohibited solely 
 i  t. onversely,  Supre e 
t's t flag-burning s i  
i  question e ic  
ised  university  atte pt punish ter-
nity  burning  's  property. 
 suppose  group repeatedly place 
  dor itory  
s  i  nothing  string 
eaning cial epithets. enja in's analysis  
t  s se t ight regard  i r c-
le     " rights privacy 
protect against s able si s 
' living space . "  
 group repeatedly 
lace  s 
announcing eetings l oung ats 
 stati  inority t  especially 
  distinguishes t  i
t ications.  
t t t university it per it r
prohibit  i l t  
ill ations i te, speech/conduct 
dichoto y i t  response t t co plex 
 r i  by ca pus ss ent  
f l i  a   dealing it li r 
i   t ists t
t  speak  ca pus. si ple t
j i 's estion-" really prepared t lis  
category f r en speech?"-   r
only s s question i categories  speech may 
 f i en it trenching upon t t
ic fr  i designed t ser ."  t ques-
t , t ence t enja in a t -
itt  i though n t t ial, r t  
i t at er fr  . 
 a ree, i  t r  f t  report, t it
a c Il  r university .  ther  ca b  n  for  
 CAD E M E ber-December 1 1 
i  e t s agree t at es ich  t  pro-
tect t e e bers f designated groups o   hos-
ile i ent" by prohibiting t e expression f r-
in i s re si t t  e principles f 
cademic f eedo . e lso agree t at t e ere s  
 st t  epithets l   e prohibited. -
 si e they may be, t eir s s  closely 
e    expression s. 
e only disagreement  Benjamin   
c it e      st t  epithets 
  e may  proscribed very narrow, Il-
f  circu stances, they re irected t 
specific ividuals  e t t f degrading  -
miliating . e c ittee's position  t t 
 tterances re re nearly s ultive t  -
nicative, e in  reats   u-
i tion  s. Benjamin   dispute t judg-
t,  e any attempt  suggest  
 e ic  s l   -
 by protecting  vior. t if,  t  e-
port argues  Benjamin deny,  bal 
lts e merely i  dialogue ea-
t  mison 'etre demic institutions, t 
ical it," s   e  arguing 
t they e protected by e ic o ? e 
 Benjamin  offering  s   i  -
ittee's l re  propose  
ll si e epithets trates t t it  r l 
 expressed by  
epithets,  ltive quality.' e -
ittee t, ho ever, charged ress-
ing relationship e ic   
civility s general,  only  considering t  
e ic  posed by t   f r -
 ass ent .  any event, report clearly 
itte 's l i  t t pruden-
l si rations, principles emic freedo , 
sel against any general attempt t  proscribe" -
 personal s .  report recognizes t t 
ce prudential tion might ll  
thought personal  i l  t   
epithets. ignore i ence t  
calling "dirty, mother-fucking - f- -
t calling "dirty, mother-fucking fag-
got simply ignore l lities  t  
 l Epithets latter,  t  
report argues, t c  i utes i i i l t t 
 t l personal identity, [and] t  t  -
t t [these] i utes  [also] t  i -
spread discri ination, injury [they i -
 on] t i l i likely t  l ti e and, 
t r f re, it special intensity." Surely, i stit -
t  t i   iff r ces i  
deciding t r disciplinary  i  appropriate. 
enja in-  i t respect i joined by l  
agner-   point. report  
il it adequate clarity t precise speech t t 
i t may appropriately proscribe h n it i  
'The report t, i f t, propose prohibiting t  us  
f  s" epithets, they  i ected t specific 
i i iduals  t requisite i t. I  merely ludes t t 
i t tions t t penalize t  t tus" epithets i  
s  stances v te t  principles f c emic 
f om.  ion er t adopt a  containing 
s  prohibition depends upon n er prudential c -
si ations t t d r i d rent i itutional settings. 
39 
directed with the requisite intent at specific individuals, 
though I think the criticism would have greater force 
if it were addressed to a code rather than a statement 
designed to elaborate general principles. Still, vague- 
ness is a vice especially to be avoided when restrictions 
on speech are involved. 
My own view, on reflection, is that the report should 
have avoided such phrases as "similar locutions." The 
only explanation- not justification- for their inclusion 
is the concern that the phrase "status epithets" would 
not encompass some speech that comes with the 
report's rationale. Assume, to vary slightly the illus- 
tration offered earlier, that a student places under the 
doors of black students' dormitory rooms a flier that 
contains only demeaning caricatures of blacks- i.e., in- 
stead of the epithet "saucerlips," it contains a picture 
of a person with Negroid facial characteristics and 
large, elongated lips; instead of "jungle-bunny," a pic- 
ture of a rabbit with Negroid facial characteristics; and 
so on. If the distribution of the flier containing the 
epithets can be proscribed, surely the same must be 
tue of the caricatures. Instead of addressing such prob- 
lems with such vague phrases as "similar locutions," 
the report should have defined more precisely the 
speech the subcommittee had in mind- as, indeed, it 
did at one point, by referring to "representations. . . 
deliberately employed to degrade or humiliate those 
at whom they are directed." 
Professor Wagner's dissection of the report's lan- 
guage demonstrates that he is a very careful reader. 
Unfortunately, it also demonstrates that he exercises 
that care very selectively. Whatever uncertainties might 
have been created by the report's use of such phrases 
as "similar locutions," it cannot plausibly be read as 
sanctioning discipline of a faculty member who assigns 
Piss Christ or- however lamentable it may be- who 
speaks "derisively" in class about "evangelical Chris- 
tianity" or the other subjects he mentions. The sub- 
committee's position, stated repeatedly in the report, 
is that there are no forbidden ideas and that even "sta- 
tus" epithets and the like may be prohibited only when 
they are directed at one or a small number of in- 
dividuals with the intention of degrading or humiliat- 
ing those at whom they are directed. Only by a willful 
misreading can one find in the report the uncertain- 
ties that Wagner purports to find. 
Jonathan Penner raises very different issues. He 
lauds the report's conclusion concerning the need for 
unrestricted expression of ideas and apparently 
accepts- at least he does not object to- the narrow res- 
trictions upon the use of "status" epithets that it sanc- 
tions, but he objects to the conclusion that faculty 
members are responsible for dealing with student use 
of "status" epithets in the classroom. Penner's initial 
concern is that faculty members lack the means to dis- 
charge that responsibility. But it both misconceives the 
issue and is just plain wrong to assert, as Penner does, 
that, "[ejxcept by the administration of physical force, 
no one can exercise control over anybody else." 
Assume, for example, that a student in a course on 
immigration policy repeatedly and derisively refers to 
Hispanics as "spies" and "wetbacks." Unless one sup- 
poses that faculty members have no responsibility for 
maintaining a classroom atmosphere conducive to the 
education of their students- surely a novel position- is 
it plausible to maintain that the faculty member who 
allows these epithets to pass without comment has dis- 
charged his obligation as a teacher? Just how the stu- 
dent's choice of language is to be dealt with is, obvi- 
ously, a matter with respect to which a faculty member 
must have a large measure of discretion. Initially, and 
depending upon the circumstances, a faculty member 
might speak privately to the student, engage the class 
in a discussion about the use and abuse of epithets, 
or even- though personally I would regard it as 
inappropriate- permit the first use to pass without 
comment. But as the student persists, the faculty mem- 
ber's obligation to, say, Hispanic students in the class 
surely calls for additional measures- perhaps a refusal 
to recognize the student, perhaps exclusion from the 
class. Institutional review of the adequacy of these 
responses is no less appropriate than is institutional 
review of the adequacy with which any other profes- 
sional obligation is met. 
Penner's second objection- that there is no general 
agreement "on what must be rebutted" or "on what 
constitutes 'false or pernicious' speech"- misconceives 
the subcommittee's position on the responsibility of 
faculty members for what occurs in their classrooms. 
The two paragraphs that discuss that responsibility ap- 
pear in a section of the report devoted to the means 
by which institutions may respond to the use of offen- 
sive "status" epithets in situations in which discipli- 
nary action is inappropriate. As earlier portions of the 
report state in the most forceful terms, the subcom- 
mittee does not contemplate- indeed would reject any 
suggestion- that faculty members should impose a 
standard of "political correctness" upon their stu- 
dents. No doubt, many ideas may be expressed in a 
class that will cause distress to some or all of its mem- 
bers. Those ideas are to be dealt with like any others, 
subjecting them to the tests of evidentiary support and 
of reasoned analysis. The gratuitous use of "status" 
epithets is to be treated differently, at least in part, pre- 
cisely because they often cannot be dealt with in that 
way. 
I am uncertain whether Professor Penner believes 
that faculty members should be free to ignore the 
gratuitous use of "status" epithets in the classroom, 
but others have made that claim, contending that the 
use of such language is protected by academic free- 
dom. Though I cannot fully argue the point here, it 
seems worth stating, if only in conclusory terms, what 
I once would have thought too obvious to mention, 
that not every use of language that is permissible in 
the street is also permissible in the classroom. 
I can deal more briefly with the comments of 
Lawrence White and Jon Wiener, both of whom gener- 
ally agree with the positions developed in the report. 
White's comments, however, reflect unease- if not ex- 
plicit disagreement- with the narrowness of the restric- 
tions on speech that the subcommittee regards as com- 
patible with academic freedom. White agrees, if I 
understand him correctly, that ideas are protected, but 
he seems inclined to extend harassment codes to a cat- 
egory of speech or conduct that he regards as offensive, 
but that does not, in his view, involve the expression 
of ideas. But the offensiveness of the conduct involved 
in the only illustration of the point he offers, the George 
Mason case, seems to depend precisely on the ideas that 
are being expressed. Perhaps I do not fully understand 
his point, but without further elaboration, it is not clear, 
at least to me, precisely what additional restrictions on 
speech White would propose. 
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  E M E ovember-December 19 1 
Wiener's argument in support of the subcommittee's 
view that institutions may proscribe the use of "sta- 
tus epithets" in narrow circumstances relies heavily 
on the Supreme Court's "fighting words" doctrine. 
Though that doctrine surely is not, as Ernst Benjamin 
mistakenly supposes it is, "judicially discredited," the 
subcommittee deliberately avoided relying primarily 
on it. The doctrine, as its name implies, has come to 
be associated primarily with speech that creates an im- 
minent risk of violence. It is, for that reason, limited 
to face-to-face insults. The subcommittee's view is that 
speech may at times come within the criteria stated in 
the report even though imminent violence is not 
threatened, as for example when fliers containing only 
demeaning racial epithets are placed under the doors 
of black students' dormitory rooms. I suspect that 
Professor Wiener shares the subcommittee's view that 
written communications of this type are as objection- 
able-and as appropriately subject to discipline- as are 
oral ones. 
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